From the Ottoman point of view this war was related to preventing Russia from taking over part of its territory or, at the very least, extending its influence into those territories. Thus, for fear of reprisals, many Turkish Moslems (up to 750,000) emigrated as the Ottoman armies retreated out of Bulgaria. Those that remained were regarded as ‘suspect’ and, by religious association, Bulgarian–speaking Moslems, the Pomaks, were included in this category. This actual and perceived religious proximity was enhanced by the geographical closeness of the two communities and the preponderantly rural, agricultural social structure which they had in common.

To understand the special place Pomaks have been ascribed in the process of nation building it is necessary to understand a little about the organisational form of the Ottoman state from which Bulgaria emerged. The Ottoman administrative unit was based on the millet, a relatively autonomous form of social organisation founded on religion. A hierarchical structure of religious communities was thus established, with Moslems at its apex, that was not dependent on ethnicity. Belonging to it had, of course, many advantages. Those who converted to Islam were freed from certain duties and, for example, the onerous cizie tax. Indeed at times converts and their families were rewarded by substantial payments from the public purse. Moslems also enjoyed wider social mobility and were the only group allowed to hold public office. On the other hand the Sultan wanted tax-paying subjects, so conversions were not a major priority. Some authorities, using cadastral records, suggest that no more than 300 families a year converted in the Balkan region.

On the other hand non-Moslems were also subjected to forced military recruitment, a levy of a specific numbers of young boys and youths per year for the janissaries. From the middle of the 14th century they were the professional core of the Ottoman army – elite units that also formed the Sultan’s bodyguard.

The recruits were forcibly converted to Islam and, according to some estimates, by 1650 there were over 85,000 of them. During the ‘off-season’ when they were not engaged in military campaigns, they also formed the police force and fire-fighting force, of great importance in the Ottoman capital because it was mainly built of wood. Whilst it is generally agreed that the first levies were carried out by force, as were the conversions, there are documentary records to show that by the 17th century some Christian families were voluntarily offering their sons for recruitment since this was one of the few avenues  of social advancement –short of the whole family converting to Islam.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the vexed question of voluntary versus forced conversions and the role that that issue embodies in the construction of Bulgarian identity, there is a statistical continuity in the social divisions of the Ottoman period that carries over to the first twenty-five years of newly independent Bulgaria. Consequently it was not until the official census in 1905 that a special category of ethnic Bulgarians of the Moslem faith was created. In this context it should be borne in mind that there are Pomaks in Greece (pomakoi), the Republic of Macedonia (torbeši) and in Turkey too. With the invention of this new statistical category Bulgaria politicians began to develop policies in relation to minorities which up till then had been theoretically regulated by the Treaty of Berlin. These were intended to create divisions and distinctions marking the parameters of that mnemonic community that was (to be) the nation. The critical question here is, to paraphrase Chattergee, whose community is being imagined and by whom? In order to propose a partial answer to that question two threads of power need to be kept in mind. Firstly, that ‘in order to create a […] community’s history and destiny, which in turn can be used to form the representation of the nation, the nation requires a useable past.’ (Misztal)